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ABSTRACT 
Wang and San Miguel report that U.S. defense contractors earn excessive profits relative 
to their industry peers. This work provides the first evidence that this phenomenon is not 
restricted to the United States. By applying Wang and San Miguel’s innovative industry-
year-size match, we found that German defense contractors earn economically 
significant, excessive profits. The comparison between German and U.S. defense 
contractors revealed similar patterns in both countries. The statistical evidence for 
excessive profitability is stronger for the measurements return on assets (ROA) and return 
on common shareholder’s equity (ROCE), while the findings for profit margin ratio 
(PMR) and operating margin ratio (OMR) are statistically less significant. 
The comparison of the regulatory environment of the United States and Germany 
showed that the contracting rules of both countries emphasize competition among 
defense contractors, but the perspectives on and uses of profit and fees differ for cost-
based contracts. In the United States, profit and fees are used to share the risk of rising 
costs between defense contractors and the government. In the German system, profit for 
defense contracts is calculated by the Bonner Equation. This difference could be a reason 
for the more pronounced excessive profits in Germany. 
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Wang and San Miguel (2012) report that U.S. defense contractors earn excessive 
profits relative to their industry peers. This research focuses on investigating whether this 
major finding of Wang and San Miguel is generalizable in the international setting, or 
only unique to the United States. Specifically, this study assesses whether the German 
defense industry—one of the major competitors of the U.S. defense industry—makes 
excessive profits as their U.S. counterpart does.  
The aforementioned research question is important for a few reasons. First, 
Germany is one of the major economies in the world. Measured by 2012 gross domestic 
product (GDP), Germany ranks the fourth in the world and the first in Europe. Specific to 
the defense industry, Germany is a major weapon producer. In 2012, the defense 
expenditure of Germany totaled €32 billion, ranking the third in Europe after UK and 
France.  
The large-scale German economy and the material size of its defense industry 
warrant the significance, as well as the necessity, of this study. Additionally, a good 
understanding of the profitability of the German defense industry is critical for German 
decision makers to set up the export policy for the defense industry. Similar to the United 
States, the export of defense articles is heavily regulated by the German government. The 
goal of this regulation is to ensure that such exports do not undermine the basic interests 
of the country. For example, one such interest is to keep the state-of-the-art advanced 
technology within the control of the country, and off the hands of various enemies, 
including, but not limited to, hostile foreign countries, terrorists groups, and criminal 
organizations. Hence, it is natural to argue that strict export control is needed to protect 
national interest.  
Overly strict export control, however, reduces the demand basis and increases 
per-unit production cost. The Federation of German Security and Defense Industries 
(BDSV), in representing the interests of all German security and defense industry 
businesses, has long argued that their industry needs exports in order to retain local jobs 
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and maintain technological advantage. Therefore, it is essential for policy makers to 
understand profit levels the defense industry is making, and whether that level of 
profitability is sufficient to keep the industry sustainable. If defense industry businesses 
are earning excessive profits, then a tighter export control may be warranted. On the other 
hand, if defense industry profits are meager, then a less restrictive export control may 
become more suitable. To the author’s knowledge, little has been done regarding the 
profitability of the German defense industry. This research intends to fill this gap and 
provide useful implications to German tax payers and government. Finally, whether 
defense industry earns excessive profits is also an ethics issue. The excessive profits 
benefit defense contractors at the expense of taxpayers. Excessive profits are neither 
efficient nor ethical. Given the large magnitude of defense expenditure, the existence, as 
well as the scale of the excessive profits of defense contractors, should be brought to the 
attention of the public and the policy makers. 
Using archived data from the Compustat database at the WRDS at University of 
Pennsylvania, we present scientific evidence to support the following main finding: 
similar to its U.S. counterpart, the German defense industry earns excessive profits 
relative to their German industry peers. 
This thesis contributes to the literature in a few ways. First, this is the first study 
to extend the topic of excessive profits of defense contractors into a non-U.S. setting and 
hence presents the first piece of international evidence. Secondly, by documenting similar 
findings as Wang and San Miguel (2012), this study demonstrates that excessive profit of 
defense contractors is an international phenomena rather than an incident unique to the 
U.S. Finally, this study sheds some light on the similarities and differences between the 
U.S. and Germany on magnitudes and determinants of defense industry excessive profits.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews literature 
and introduces the specific environments of German defense industry. Chapter III 
describes data and methodologies, and Chapter IV presents findings. Chapter V 
concludes. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PROFITABILITY AND EXCESSIVE PROFITS: DEFINITION AND 
MEASUREMENTS 
This chapter reviews the literature about the definition and measurements of a 
firms’ profitability and excessive profits that are essential to this study. Further, we 
discuss the research of Wang and San Miguel (2012), and introduce their major findings 
based on U.S. data. 
1. Terms and Definitions 
In order to achieve a better understanding of this thesis, some basic terms need to 
be defined. First, we define some statistical terms, which we use for our analysis. Next, 
the accounting terminology is explained. 
The source for the definition of statistical methodology used for this thesis is the 
eighth edition of the textbook Statistics for Management and Economics by Gerald Keller 
(2009). This textbook provides an overview of statistical terms and methods that are 
especially useful for economic analyses, which are reported in this thesis. To explain the 
computation and interpretation of statistical data, the book uses many examples that are 
related to economical topics.  
Statistics differentiate between data about a population and data from samples of 
this population. Keller defines a population as, “a group of all items of interest to a 
statistics practitioner. It is frequently very large and may, in fact, be infinitely large” 
(2009, p. 5). One goal of statistics is to come to an inference about the population using a 
descriptive measure called parameter. In our study, we use different parameters to 
describe excessive profits of defense contractors. Keller defines a sample parameter as, “a 
set of data drawn from a population” (2009, p. 5). In order to make an inference about a 
population, sample parameters are drawn from this population, because the examination 
of the population is usually very expensive or impossible. 
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To describe a population or a sample, measures of central location give a quick 
first impression about the data. We use the arithmetic mean and the median to describe 
the central location of our samples.  
The terms mean and arithmetic mean are used interchangeably in this thesis. 









  (1) 
In Equation (1), µ is the mean of a parameter that describes the population, xi is a 
single observation of this parameter, and N is the number of individuals, which make up 
the whole population. The calculation of the mean of a sample is very similar to the 
calculation of the population mean. Keller gives Equation (2) to calculate the sample 










  (2) 
In Equation (2), x  is the mean of the sample, xi are the single observations of the 
sample, and n is the number of observations in the sample. It is possible to infer from a 
sample mean to a population mean.  
The second measure of central location used in this thesis is the median. Keller 
defines a median as, “calculated by placing all observations in order (ascending or 
descending). The observation that falls in the middle is the median” (2009, p. 99). The 
median is especially useful when single observations in a sample are extremely high or 
low, so that the mean gives a flawed impression of the central location of the sample. 
In our analysis, we also use measures of variability. First, we use the minimum 
and the maximum of our observations. The minimum is the observation that has the 
smallest number. The maximum is the observation in the sample that has the highest 
number. Minimum and maximum give a good impression of the spread of our 
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observations. Additionally, these numbers indicate whether we have to look for outriders, 
and determine their impact on our sample. 
Another important measure of variability is the standard deviation. Keller defines 
the standard deviation as, “the positive square root of the variance” (2009, p. 110). To 

















  (3) 
In Equation (3), s
2
 is the variance of the sample, n is the sample size, xi are the 
observed values of the sample, and x  is the mean of the sample. Keller’s definition of the 

















  (4) 
In Equation (4), s, is the standard deviation of the sample.  
The thirteenth edition of Financial Accounting–An Introduction to Concepts, 
Methods, and Uses by Clyde P. Stickney, Roman L. Weil, Kathrine Schipper, and 
Jennifer Francis (2010), is a useful source for the definitions of accounting terms and 
concepts. The textbook gives a brief overview of the basic principles of financial 
accounting, and helps the reader to understand and evaluate financial statements of 
publically-traded companies. Because this thesis primarily uses financial statement 
information to conduct analysis, many concepts used in this study are well defined in the 
book. According to Stickney et al. (2010), profit is defined as the difference between 
revenues and expenses to generate these revenues (p. 145). It is used interchangeably 
with the terms net income and earnings. According to Stickney et al. (2010, p. 145), the 
profit of a firm “reflects the change in net assets as a result of a firm’s operating activities 
during an accounting period.” Profit is measured over a defined period-of-time, known as 
the accounting period. This period-of-time is typically a quarter or a year. A publically-
traded company reports its profit in the income statement. 
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“Revenues reflect the net assets (assets less liabilities) that a firm receives from its 
customers when it sells goods or renders services” (Stickney et al., 2010, p. 145). 
Revenues are measured for the same period-of-time as profit and are reported in the 
income statement of a company.  
“Expenses reflect the net assets consumed in generating revenues” (Stickney et 
al., 2010, p. 145). As revenues and profit, expenses are reported in the income statement 
for a defined period-of-time.  
Stickney et al. follows SFAC (statement of financial accounting concepts of the 
FASB) No. 6, and defines an asset as “probable future economic benefits obtained or 
controlled by a particular entity as a result of a past transaction” (2010, p. 841). Assets 
can be all types of tangible and intangible things that have an economic value, and there 
are current assets that can be transformed into cash within a short period-of-time. In 
contrast, fixed assets cannot be transformed into cash easily. Examples of fixed assets are 
a production plant or tools for the production. Assets are reported on the balance sheet, 
which reflects assets along with liabilities and shareholder’s equity. Many ratios that are 
used to assess the profitability of companies relate profits to assets.   
Common equity is defined as a common shareholder’s equity on the balance 
sheet. In this thesis, the term common equity is used and defined in the same way as 
Stickney et al. (2010, p. 47). The stated value of common stock (i.e., book value) usually 
differs significantly from the price at which it is traded at the stock exchange (i.e., market 
value), but it is still often used to assess the profitability from common shareholders’ 
perspective. 
The term profitability is described as “a nontechnical term meaning the potential 
for, or actual earning of, net income” (Stickney et al., 2010, p. 897). Different measures 
of profitability are discussed in the following part of this thesis. 
2. Measuring Profitability 
For existing investors and owners of a company, it is of their interest to 
understand how much return they earn on their investments relative to alternative, 
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forgone investment opportunities. Additionally, new investors want to know what 
companies are profitable candidates in which they can invest. Therefore, investors need 
to compare profitability across different companies. Financial ratios based on financial 
statements serve that purpose well, because they control the effects on magnitude of 
profits that stem from different company sizes. This study employs four different 
profitability ratios to compare the profitability of defense contractors with their non-
defense contractor peers. Namely, these four ratios include Return on Assets (ROA), 
Return on Common Equity (ROCE), Profit Margin Ratio (PMR), and Operating Margin 
Ratio (OMR). 
“The Rate of Return on Assets (ROA) measures a firm’s performance in using 
assets to generate net income” (Stickney et al., 2010, p. 245).  







   (5) 
As discussed previously, net income or profit is calculated for a period-of-time, 
while total assets are reported for a specific point in time. To calculate ROA, the total 
assets reported by the company at the end of the accounting period, for which the net 
income was reported, are used.  
For shareholders who want to know how profitable their investment in a company 
is, the rate of return on common shareholder’s equity (ROCE) is another interesting 
measure. In contrast to ROA, ROCE relates profit to common equity. In this study the 
ROCE is calculated using Equation (6). It “measures a firm’s performance in using and 






Common Shareholder s Equity
   (6) 
Because common shareholder’s equity is reported on the balance sheet, it is only a 
snapshot at a point in time. Net income is reported for an accounting period. In the same 
way as discussed above for ROA, the common equity reported by the company at the end 
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of the accounting period, for which the net income was reported, is used to calculate 
ROCE. 
Another interesting measure for the profitability of a company is the profit margin 
ratio (PMR). This ratio indicates what percentage of the revenue (topline of the income 
statement) eventually becomes profit (bottom line of the income statement). Stickney et 
al. define the PMR as the “measures of a firm’s ability to control the level of expenses 
relative to sales, to increase the selling prices relative to the level of expenses incurred, or 
a combination of the two. By holding down expenses or increasing selling prices, a firm 
can increase the profits from a given amount of sales activity” (2010, p. 248). Equation 





   (7) 
The operating margin ratio (OMR) relates earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
to revenue. Stickney et al. define the operating margin as “revenues from sales minus 
cost of goods sold and operating expenses” (2010, p. 891). Compared to the PMR, the 
OMR is especially useful for the comparison of companies who pay different taxes and 






   (8) 
ROA, ROCE, PMR, and OMR are the ratios used in this study to compare 
German defense contractors with their non-defense contractor peers. Each ratio describes 
profitability from a different perspective. Additionally, ratios control for the size of the 
company because they relate absolute numbers to total assets or revenues, which are 
indicators of the size of a company.  
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3. Measuring Excessive Profitability of Defense Contractors: The 
Industry-Year-Size Matching Approach and Findings Based on U.S. 
Defense Contractors 
Because this study uses the same methodology to measure excessive profitability 
as Wang and San Miguel (2012), this section discusses their paper. First, we describe the 
rationale, as well as the design of their industry-year-size matching approach to assess the 
defense contractors’ excessive profitability. Next, we introduce their findings regarding 
excessive profitability of U.S. defense contractors. 
Wang and San Miguel (2012) claim that some frequently used measures for 
defense contractors’ excessive profitability are fundamentally flawed, because they often 
compare defense contractors’ profitability with the profitability of a large group of firms 
often represented by popular indices like the S&P 500. They argue that, “it is 
meaningless to use a very broadly-defined index as the benchmark for inferring the 
defense contractors’ normal profitability. The defense contractors (as a whole or as 
individual firms) and the broad market, are two different animals” (2012, p. 396). 
Further, they refer to earlier academic research (McGahan & Porter, 2002, pp. 834–851) 
that supports the following argument: 
Profitability is very industry-specific. Different industries have different 
risk exposures, competitions, and entry barriers, among many others. 
Therefore, given the wide industry representation of defense contractors, 
the correct benchmark for inferring defense contractors’ normal 
profitability (and hence excessive profitability) must focus on the 
individual firm level. (Wang & San Miguel, 2012, p. 369) 
Wang and San Miguel (2012) also cite McGahan & Porter 2002, pp. 834–851; 
Albuquerque, 2009, pp. 69–89; and Dechow, Hutton & Sloan, 1996, pp. 1–20, and argue 
that profitability varies across different years and depends on the size of a company. To 
reduce variation in profitability that is caused by effects from industry, firm year, and 
size, they introduced their new industry-year-size match to find benchmark firms for 
defense contractors. This method controls the three main reasons of differences in 
profitability and therefore, ensures that the remaining difference is very likely explained 
by the status of a company as defense contractor or non-defense contractor. 
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Another assumption of Wang and San Miguel is that a “significant contracting 
relationship continuity exists between the government and the defense contractors” 
(2012, pp. 396–397). This assumption allows the use of multiple years of data for the 
same defense contractor and hence, effectively increases the sample size. Using 
“fedspending.org” as the data source, Wang and San Miguel identified 112 publically 
traded companies from the 2008 list of “top 500 Department of Defense Contractors,” 
and used their data for multiple years as a sample of defense contractors. Each company 
generates multiple firm-years depending on available financial accounting data. The 
Compustat database available from the WRDS at University of Pennsylvania is used to 
extract accounting data. Their search yielded 4,099 firm-years in a timeframe from 1950–
2010. A benchmark firm-year for each sample firm-year was then identified. 
The benchmark firm-year is selected based on a three-dimension match on 
industry, year, and size. Specifically, we go to the same industry-year 
where industry membership is defined as four-digit SIC codes, and 
identify the non-defense (i.e., not on our 112-firm list) firm that has the 
best size match with our defense firm-year. The difference between the 
profit of the firm-year investigated and the profit of the benchmark firm-
year will be the measure of “excessive profit.” (Wang & San Miguel, 
2012, p. 397) 
Wang and San Miguel (2012) used statistical methods to show that U.S. defense 
contractors earn excessive profits relative to their industry peers. For their sample, they 
reported the mean of excessive ROA, ROCE, PMR, and OMR, respectively. Moreover, 
they conducted T-tests to demonstrate the statistical significance of their findings. The 
results based on ROA, ROCE, and PMR are statistically significant and show that profits 
of U.S. defense contractors are excessive. The findings based on OMR neither 
demonstrated higher nor lower profitability of defense contractors. A summary of Wang 
and San Miguel’s findings is shown in Table 1. 
 11 
Table 1.   The excessive profitability of U.S. defense contractors (from Wang 
& San Miguel, 2012, p. 398, Table 5). 
 N Mean Min Max Std Dev t P-value 
Panel A: Size matched by Total Assets 
Excessive  
ROA (%) 
3,809 1.12 -23.49 44.17 7.08 9.773 <0.0001 
Excessive  
ROCE (%) 
3,314 3.65 -143.64 175.57 25.73 8.083 <0.0001 
Excessive  
PMR (%) 
3,809 0.28 -31.82 74.56 7.87 2.223 0.03 
Excessive  
OMR (%) 
3,777 -0.09 -59.59 257.33 10.32 -0.52 0.60 
Panel B: Size matched by Revenue 
Excessive  
ROA (%) 
3,825 1.04 -21.89 44.37 7.29 8.803 <0.0001 
Excessive 
ROCE (%) 
3,246 3.71 -142.09 178.70 26.08 8.103 <0.0001 
Excessive 
 PMR (%) 
3,825 0.45 -31.82 74.91 7.23 3.853 0.0001 
Excessive 
OMR (%) 
3,793 0.35 -48.23 69.29 7.80 2.772 0.0006 
 
In addition to the investigation of the existence of excessive profits, Wang and 
San Miguel also found some determinants for their findings. First, they found that the 
magnitude of excessive profits increased after 1992 due to a consolidation of the defense 
industry beginning at that time. This consolidation led to a lower number of defense 
contractors in the United Stated and hence increased the bargaining power of the 
remaining companies. Second, they showed that “poorer quality of corporate governance 
measured by the duality of CEO and Chairman of the Board is positively associated with 
the excessive profits” (Wang & San Miguel, 2012, p. 402). Wang expanded his work in 
2013 and demonstrated that, “in contrast to the prediction of ‘corruption hypothesis,’ the 
excessive profits are less (more) pronounced for those contractors with politically 
connected (non-connected) boards” (Wang, 2013, p. 426). Based on Wang’s and San 
Miguel’s findings, determinants for the magnitude of excessive profits are the bargaining 
power of defense contractors, corporate governance, and political connection of the 
board. 
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To summarize, profitability of different companies can be compared by using 
various ratios. In addition, we introduce the industry-year-size matching method to 
measure excessive profitability, which will be applied to German defense contractors in 
this study. 
B. GERMAN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS AND THE REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT 
In order to assess the results of this study, it is important to understand the 
German defense industry, defense contractors, and the German regulatory environment in 
which defense procurement is conducted. In this chapter, we first have a brief overview 
of the German defense industry and defense contractors servicing German Armed Forces; 
then we move on to introduce the regulatory environment and explain how defense 
contracts are awarded in Germany. The final part of this chapter provides basic statistics 
of, and the regulatory environment for, German defense exports. 
1. The German Defense Industry and German Defense Contractors 
We distinguish between German defense industry and German defense 
contractors. German defense contractors are those companies that have contracts with the 
German Ministry of Defense or the German Armed Forces. The German defense industry 
consists of companies based in Germany that produce armament, weapons, as well as 
equipment for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (C4ISR). It is important to realize that most companies of the German 
defense industry are also contractors of the German Armed Forces, but some contractors 
provide goods or services that are not typically defense or security oriented.  
Next, we will describe the German defense industry, based on the IHS Jane’s 
overview of the German defense industry (2014). We will then demonstrate that there are 
defense contractors who do not belong to the German defense industry in a narrow sense. 
In its overview of the German defense industry, IHS Jane’s (2014) states: 
Germany’s defense industry comprises around 200 companies, with eight 
major players. The German defense sector employs a workforce of some 
98,000 people with a further 120,000 employed with the industry’s 
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suppliers and contractors. In 2011, the volume of goods produced by the 
German defense sector was EUR21.3 billion. 
The major organization of the defense industry is the Federation of German 
Security and Defense Industries. According to this organization, “small and medium-
sized companies (Mittelstand) account for more than half of the value created by the 
German security and defense industry” (IHS Jane’s, 2014). Consistent with this fact, 
most of the German defense contractors are privately owned or have the legal status of a 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH). These companies usually do not publish 
financial statements. Only very few companies are publically traded and provide financial 
statements. This data limitation sharply reduces our sample size.  
The German defense industry provides a broad base of technology products, 
including but not limited to aerospace, naval capabilities, tactical vehicles, main battle 
tanks, small arms and ammunition, and various areas of C4ISR systems. “Exports play a 
major role in the success of the German defense companies” (IHS Jane’s, 2014). Besides 
other European countries, German defense technology is exported to countries in the 
Middle East, Asia, and Latin America (IHS Jane’s 2014).  
Despite the fact that the German defense industry is a major contributor to the 
contracting business of the German Armed Forces; some major contractors are not 
German companies. One example is the Airbus Group (former EADS), which is best 
described as a European company with its headquarters in the Netherlands and 
subsidiaries in Germany. Some U.S. companies, like Northrop Grumman, also have 
subsidiaries in Germany and are defense contractors for the German armed forces. 
Some German armed forces contractors operate outside the typical area of the 
defense industry. For example, the Deutsche Bahn AG operates the German railroad 
network for the transportation of people and goods. The company formed a joint venture 
with the German ministry of defense, the Bw Fuhrparkservice GmbH, which provides 
civil cars to the German armed forces (BwFuhrparkservice GmbH, n.d.). 
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We have shown the difference between the German Defense industry and German 
defense contractors. This study focuses exclusively on German defense contractors who 
have their headquarters in Germany.  
2. The Regulatory Environment for German Defense Contractors 
This section summarizes the regulatory environment for German defense 
contractors and describes the defense budget and how defense contracts are awarded in 
Germany. First, the legal system for awarding contracts is discussed. Second, the practice 
of determining a fair and reasonable price for defense contracts is explained. The final 
part describes the German defense budget and how it relates to different kinds of defense 
contracts.  
Several laws and regulations govern the awarding of public contracts in Germany. 
In addition, directives of the European Union apply. There is no single set of rules in 
parallel to the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR, 2014) in Germany. Some 
general policies are laid out in the German act against restraints of competition (2011, 
§97). These policies state that contracts shall be awarded “through competition and by 
way of transparent award procedures.” Further, “the participants in an award procedure 
shall be treated equally.” Since the German industrial base consists primarily of small and 
medium-sized companies, “the interests of small and medium-sized undertakings shall 
primarily be taken into account in an award procedure.” The law further demands 
“skilled, efficient, law abiding and reliable undertakings” for the award of contracts. 
When offers are compared, “the economically most advantageous tender shall be 
accepted.”  
The term “economically most advantageous” is further defined in the regulations 
on contract awards for public supplies and services-part A (2009). It states that, “in the 
contract evaluation, all contractual considerations must be taken into account (e.g., price, 
technical, functional, formal, aesthetic aspects; customer service; follow-on costs; life 
cycle costs)” (“Regulations on contract,” 2009, p. 44). Further, “the most economically 
advantageous tender is the one with the most favorable price-performance ratio” 
(“Regulations on contract,” 2009, p. 48).  
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German and European laws distinguish among public invitations to tender, 
restricted invitations to tender, single tendering (“Regulations on contract,” 2009, Article 
3), open procedure, “restricted procedure, negotiated procedure, or competitive dialogue” 
(“Regulations on contract,” 2009, Article 3 EC) to award contracts. The type of award is 
determined by the expected value of the contract and by the type of product or service 
procured. When the value of a contract exceeds €134,000 for public supply and service 
contracts, €207,000 for public supply and service contracts awarded by specifically 
defined contracting agencies (among them is the German Federal Ministry of Defense), 
and €5,186,000 for public works contracts, European law, especially the DIRECTIVE 
2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, 
public supply contracts and public service contracts, is applied (DIRECTIVE 
2004/18/EC, 2013, Article 7 and ANNEX IV). These limits were last changed in 2013. 
The main implication of the European law is that contracts have to be solicited 
throughout all members of the European Union. The DIRECTIVE 2004/18/EC is 
implemented in the German law by the Regulations on Contract Awards for Public 
Supplies and Services–Part A (“Regulations on contract,” 2013), in Section 2.  
In general, there is a preference toward using public invitations to tender for 
contracts below the threshold amount, and the open procedure for contracts above the 
threshold amount. Under these two procedures, the request for proposal is published, and 
an unlimited number of proposals will be accepted and evaluated. The German 
contracting authority can only use other types of awards when designated in the 
regulations on contract awards for public supplies and services-part A (2009). In the case 
of a restricted invitation to tender or a restricted procedure, those who are interested in 
the contract may contact the contracting authority, but only a few contractors are asked to 
submit a tender. The contracting authority is not allowed to negotiate with bidders when 
they apply the procedure invitations to tender, the open procedure, and for the restricted 
procedure (“regulations on contract,” 2009, Articles 15 and 15 EC).  
Single tendering means that the contracting authorities “generally approach 
several selected enterprises to negotiate with one or more on the contractual terms and 
conditions” (“regulations on contract,” 2009, Article 3). The DIRECTIVE 2004/18/EC 
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(2013, Article 1–11.d) defines negotiated procedures as, “those procedures whereby the 
contracting authorities consult the economic operators of their choice and negotiate the 
terms of contract with one or more of these.” Competitive dialogue is a procedure for 
complex and only vaguely known requirements. DIRECTIVE 2004/18/EC (2013, Article 
1–11.c) defines it as “a procedure in which any economic operator may request to 
participate and whereby the contracting authority conducts a dialogue with the candidates 
admitted to that procedure, with the aim of developing one or more suitable alternatives 
capable of meeting its requirements, and on the basis of which the candidates chosen are 
invited to tender.”  
To recap, the German and European laws emphasize competition in a similar way 
as the U.S. FAR. In Germany, the request for proposal must be designed in a way that 
takes the needs of small and medium-sized companies into consideration; however, there 
are no contracts for these companies that are set aside. In contrast, FAR subpart 19.5 
describes that U.S. contracting authorities can award contracts exclusively to small 
businesses. For German defense contractors, this means that they have to prepare 
competitive proposals for a competitive market to get business from the government. In 
many cases, they face competition from other German companies and from European 
companies, which have to be treated equally by law. 
The German law defines market-based pricing and different kinds of cost-based 
pricing for public contracts. According to §5 of the Verordnung PR Nr 30/53 über die 
Preise bei öffentlichen Aufträgen (Regulation PR No 30/53 on prices of public contracts; 
Verordnung PR Nr 30/53, 2010), the German regulation on prices of public contracts, 
cost-based prices are only allowed when no market-based price is available. When cost-
based prices are used, the proposal must include a cost-based price calculation, which 
follows the rules that are defined in the appendix of Verordnung PR Nr 30/53.  
Cost-based prices are classified into fixed-cost prices, target-cost prices, and cost-
reimbursement prices. Fixed-cost prices are calculated before or directly after conclusion 
of the contract (Verordnung PR Nr 30/53, 2010, §6 (2)). A target-cost price is used when 
a fixed-cost price cannot be determined at the conclusion of the contract. It has to be 
changed to a fixed-cost price as soon as a fixed price can be calculated (Verordnung PR 
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Nr 30/53, 2010, §6 (3)). Cost-reimbursement prices are only allowed when it is 
impossible to use any other method to determine the price (Verordnung PR Nr 30/53, 
2010, §7 (1)). This leads to a hierarchy of acceptable mechanisms to find prices. Market 
prices are preferred over cost based prices. Fixed-cost prices are preferred over target-
cost prices, and target-cost prices are preferred over cost reimbursement prices.  
In cost-based prices, profit is paid to reimburse the contractor for the general 
business risk and for special achievements in economic, technical, or organizational 
terms (“Leitsätze für die Preisermittlung,” 2003, Nr 51). Within the German Ministry of 
Defense, the general business risk is calculated via the “Bonner Equation” (German 
Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement, 1989), shown in Equation (9): 
 0.05 ( 1.5 ) 0.01
BNAV
G Q E F
BNV
        (9) 
In Equation (9), G is the profit, and Q is a factor that varies with the type of 
contract, as shown in Table 2. BNAV is the value of fixed assets of the contractor. BNV 
is the value of total assets of the company. E is the cost of the primary contractor, and F 
is the cost of material and subcontracted work packages.  
Table 2.   Factor Q for different types of contracts. 
Type of contract Q 
Maintenance 0.70 
Procurement of goods 1.05 
Research and Development 1.10 
 
The Bonner Equation shows how general business risk is compensated for 
contracts of the German Ministry of Defense. The contractor is allowed to mark up 
materials and subcontracted work by 1%, while the cost of its own work, risk adjusted for 
type of contracts, and the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, has a higher (5%) mark-up 
rate. Note that companies who invest more money into tangible assets get a higher 
compensation because a higher portion of fixed assets usually means a higher risk.  
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German laws do not allow any types of risk sharing between the contractor and 
the government. Profit is always calculated based on costs. Unless the price is calculated 
based on fixed costs before the contract is signed, the German government always bears 
the risk of rising costs. This leads to the implication that profits from contracts with the 
German government are pure savings for contractors.  
Although Germany and the U.S. both have price-based and cost-based contracts, 
the methods differ significantly, especially for cost-based contracts. For example, the 
FAR allows several risk-sharing and incentive-driven tools, including, but not limited to, 
cost-plus-incentive fee and fixed-price incentive contracts, as described in FAR Part 16.4. 
These incentive contracts, which are not seen in current German practice, also motivate 
contractors to contain costs.  
Next, we will discuss the German defense budget and its allocation toward 
German defense contracts. The German Defense Budget of 2013 was €33.26 Billion, 
about 11% of the total federal budget (German Ministry of Defense, 2012). Compared to 
2012, it increased by €1.38 Billion. A major part of this budget was used for personnel, 
for example, €10.77 Billion was paid for active duty military and civilians, and €5.04 
Billion was used to pay for retired soldiers and civil employees. Together, these two parts 
account for 47.5% of the defense budget. The operations and support budget contains 
€2.56 Billion for maintenance of materials, and €6.15 Billion for other expenses, which 
include fuel, rent, and the operating costs of military bases. €1.62 Billion was used for 
military services that are operated by external contractors or public private partnerships. 
Military investments account for €7.12 Billion or 21.4% of the budget. The German 
ministry of defense classifies the categories Research and Development (€0.93 Billion), 
military procurement (€5.12 Billion), military infrastructure (€0.93 Billion) and other 
investments (€0.15 Billion) as military investments. Expenditures for active duty and 
retired personnel are not available for defense contracts. These costs add up to €15.81 
Billion. The rest of the German defense budget, €17.45 Billion, is available for different 
types of contracts. Figure 1 provides a graphical presentation of the German Defense 
Budget of 2013. 
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Figure 1.  The German defense budget for 2013 (from German Ministry of 
Defense, 2012). 
To summarize, German defense contractors face competition from the whole 
European Union, German defense contracting prices are determined through the 
hierarchy of acceptable mechanisms, and the German Defense Budget of 2013 included 
up to €17.46 Billion for defense contracts. This data provides a sufficient overview of the 
regulatory and business environment in which German defense contractors operate. The 
next section discusses regulations and statistics of German defense exports. 
3. German Defense Exports 
The German industry in general, and the German defense industry specifically, 
are both export oriented. According to the report on defense exports of the German 
federal government for FY 2013 (German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
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Energy, 2014), the German defense industry exported €933 Million of defense goods in 
2013, a slight decrease from €946 Million in 2012. Moreover, the German government 
approved exports of defense goods worth €5.846 Billion, an increase from €4.704 Billion 
in 2012. The values of exported goods and approved exports differ because the time of 
the approval of the export and the time of departure of goods are not necessarily in the 
same year. Out of the total exports, only 33% went to EU, NATO, and allies, leaving 
67% to other countries, of which the Republic of Korea (€274.7 Million), the United 
Arab Emirates (€102.3 Million), Algeria (€59.1 Million), and Singapore (€52.5 Million) 
were the major recipients. These numbers show that the German defense industry 
operates in a worldwide market. For instance, the €5.846 Billion of approved exports in 
2013 was even more than the €5.12 Billion procurement budget of the 2013 defense 
budget. Hence, exports play a vital role in the German defense industry.  
Regarding the approval process for defense exports, Article 26 (2) of the Basic 
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (2010), the German constitution states that, 
“weapons designed for warfare may be manufactured, transported, or marketed only with 
the permission of the Federal Government. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.” 
The Constitution deals with war weapons because it was written in the late 1940s, after 
World War II, and during the founding phase of West Germany. This is one of the 
precautions included in the Constitution to prevent the start of a new war from Germany. 
The spirit that guided the authors of the Constitution in the 1940s—to avoid another war 
like World War II—is still part of the German philosophy regarding defense. This 
philosophy exists in the German government, as well as in general public. The federal 
law, which regulates the details in Article 26 of the Basic Law, is the Gesetz über die 
Kontrolle von Kriegswaffen (2013) (English translation: war weapons control act). This 
law details what is meant by the term war weapons, and includes a list of those war 
weapons. In addition to this law, the foreign trade and payments act (2013) and the 
foreign trade and payments ordinance (2013) contain rules and regulations for the export 
of defense goods. The foreign trade and payments ordinance (2013) also includes a more 
detailed list of weapons, ammunition, and defense goods.  
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Defense exports are under tight political control in Germany. The first point of 
contact to apply for a permission to export war weapons is the federal foreign office. The 
application for the permission to export other armaments, which are mentioned in the 
foreign trade and payments act (2013), is submitted to the federal office of economics 
and export control. Depending upon the importance of the export and whether products 
that are legally classified as war weapons are involved, the application moves up the 
chain of command to the federal minister of economic affairs and energy or the federal 
minister for foreign affairs. Important deals—which are of high value or involve 
important technology—are decided by the Federal Security Council. The Federal 
Security Council is chaired by the Bundeskanzler, the head of the executive German 
government. In addition, members of the Federal Security Council include the ministers 
of the departments of foreign affairs, defense, economic affairs and energy, interior, 
justice, economic cooperation and development, and the head of the Federal Chancellery 
and Federal Minister for Special Tasks. This committee discusses the German security 
policy, its strategic direction, and approves defense exports. Meetings of this council are 
secret and happen unnoticed from the public (Behme, 2008). 
To recap, exports of the German defense industry are subject to a high level of 
control and scrutiny, and are important to the sustainable growth of the German defense 
industry. Historically, the German government has been weighing national security 
interests against economic interests of the defense industry in decision making.  
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA SOURCE 
To conduct this research study, it was necessary to identify German defense 
contractors and analyze their financial statements. In this section, we will describe the 
process of identifying defense contractors as a sample, and then introduce how we obtain 
financial data for these contractors. 
To be included in the sample, a company must be a publically-traded defense 
contractor that is headquartered in Germany. Publically-traded companies are obligated 
by law to publish financial reports, which make data readily available. In addition, public 
firms in the same country (i.e., Germany in this case) follow similar regulatory and legal 
environment, which makes data comparable. Limiting the sample to publicly traded 
firms—while desirable for reasons mentioned above—nevertheless significantly reduces 
the sample size. As shown in Chapter II, many German defense contractors are small and 
medium sized companies that are not publically traded and consequently are excluded. 
Because no official defense contractor’s list is available from the German 
government, alternative sources have to be used to identify defense contractors. For the 
purpose of this thesis, a request for data to the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, 
Information Technology, and In-Service Support was rejected. The German government 
and its agencies are not allowed to publish names of companies that contract with the 
German government. This is proprietary information of the companies and protected by 
German law. The starting point for identifying German defense contractors was an article 
by Boris Hänßler (2013) in his Internet blog www.robotergesetze.com. In this article, 
Hänßler describes the German defense industry and its economic significance to 
Germany. This article includes a list of companies that are part of the German defense 
industry, along with a short description of their defense-related products. Each company 
on his list was investigated for the availability of financial reports in the Compustat data 
base. This database provides historical fundamental data of companies (i.e., data from 
financial reports) and market data in a standardized format, which allows convenient data 
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analysis. It is maintained and marketed by Standard & Poors Capital IQ and was accessed 
via WRDS. The next step was to find additional evidence regarding whether a particular 
company was a defense contractor. Sources for this evidence include publications by the 
company or equipment that is used by the German armed forces and produced by that 
company. The next section shows such evidence for each sample company.  
Once the German defense contractors were identified, we extracted accounting 
data from financial reports. This data was conveniently available in the Compustat data 
base, which was accessed through WRDS at the University of Pennsylvania. In contrast 
to U.S. data, which is available from 1950 until today, data for international companies is 
only available from June 1987 until today. For this research, we use annual report data. 
We use country code DEU to identify a German company. This data was received as MS 
Excel spreadsheets. We then programmed macros to conduct the analyses.  
B. THE SAMPLE 
This section describes our sample of German defense contractors. First, a general 
summary is given, followed by basic statistics. Next, each sample company is described 
and qualification evidence is presented.  
1. Summary of the Sample 
Ten German defense contractors were identified for our research. The data of 
these companies are summarized in Table 3, and a short description of each company and 
its contractual relationship with the German Ministry of Defense is presented in the next 
section. As described in research by Wang and San Miguel (2012), we assume that 
contracting continuity exists between the German government and the defense 
contractors, which provides the use of multiple firm years when a contracting relationship 
is displayed. Table 3.   shows the years for which financial data is available for each 
company of the sample. In total, we have 171 sample firm years. To demonstrate the size 
of each company, we display the total assets and revenue for each company in 2012. In 
2012, company size in terms of total assets ranged from €27.6 Million to €162.978 
Billion, and the revenue of the same firms in 2012 ranged from €29.8 Million to €114.3 
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Billion. These numbers show that our sample covers a wide range of different-sized 
companies.  












THYSSENKRUPP AG 1989 -2013 24 3300 38,284.0 40,124.0 
Tognum AG 2004 -2012 8 3510 2,929.5 3,014.5 
Renk AG 1989 -2013 24 3560 553.9 476.0 
Daimler AG 1989 -2013 24 3711 162,978.0 114,297.0 
Rheinmetall AG 1989 -2013 24 3711 4,899.0 4,704.0 
MTU Aero Engines AG 2001 -2013 12 3724 4,261.9 3,378.6 
OHB AG 2000 -2013 13 3760 535.7 625.2 
Draegerwerk AG 1989 -2013 24 3841 2,101.2 2,373.5 
Conet Technologie AG 2007 -2012 5 7370 36.3 95.9 
LS Telcom AG 2000 -2013 13 7372 27.6 29.8 
Totals     171       
 
Table 4.   presents some basic statistics of the sample. In particular, we show 
mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of ROA, ROCE, OMR, 
PMR, total assets, and revenue. The mean of ROA is 2.71%, while the mean of ROCE is 
11.65%. The means of OMR and PMR are 4.18% and 1.68%, respectively. The number 
of total assets and revenue show that the size of the companies varies widely. 
Specifically, the mean and median difference is big, as is the standard deviation. 
Table 4.   Basic statistics of the sample of German defense contractors. 







Mean 2.71% 11.65% 4.18% 1.68% 24,120.47 21,763.33 
Median 3.63% 13.11% 4.70% 3.72% 2,190.81 2,373.83 
Min  -36.23% -131.16% -118.05% -104.21% 6.31 6.37 
Max 13.76% 276.37% 18.70% 10.45% 207,410.00 162,384.00 
StdDev 6.54% 32.35% 11.05% 12.99% 50,007.93 40,958.26 
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The sample covers different industries. The industry is identified by the four-digit 
Standard Industry Code (SIC). Table 5.   summarizes the industries’ information, using 
the   website www.siccode.com to define the SIC codes. The SIC code has a hierarchical 
structure, and to find the SIC industry matches we use the first two digits to describe a 
general industry sector, the third digit to refine the industry to a group, and the fourth 
digit to specify the business area. Table 5.   contains descriptions of the two-digit, three-
digit, and four-digit SIC codes of the sample. When the third and fourth digit is zero, the 
industry cannot be specified in further detail than by the first two or three digits of the 
SIC code. 
Table 5.   Description of the industries covered by the sample from 
SICCODE at www.siccode.com. 
SIC code Description of the industry  Frequency 
in sample 
3300 Primary Metal Industry 1 
3500 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer Equipment 
3 
3510 Engines and Turbines 1 
3540 Metalworking, Machinery and Equipment 1 
3560 General Industrial Machinery and Equipment 1 
3600 Electronic and other Electrical Equipment and 
Components, except Computer Equipment 
1 
3670 Electronic Components and Accessories 1 
3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices 1 
3700 Transportation Equipment 4 
3710 Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment 2 
3711 Motor Vehicles and Passenger Car Bodies 2 
3720 Aircraft and Parts 1 
3724 Aircraft Engines and Engine Parts 1 
3760 Guided Missiles and Space Vehicle Parts 1 
3800 Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling 
Instruments; Photographic, Medical and Optical 
Goods; Watches and Clocks 
1 
3840 Surgical, Medical, and Dental Instruments and 
Supplies 
1 
3841 Surgical and Medical Instruments and Apparatus 1 
7300 Business Services 2 
7370 Computer Programming, Data Processing, and 
other Computer Related Services 
2 
7372 Prepackaged Software 1 
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2. Description of the Defense Contractors 
This section describes the companies of our sample. We will give a short 
introduction of the business of each company and proof that the company is a defense 
contractor. In all cases, we use publications of the companies that indicate contracts with 
the German ministry of defense. 
(1) Thyssen Krupp AG 
The Thyssen Krupp AG is a traditional German company with its roots in the 
German steel business, which broadened its business over time. Currently, Thyssen 
Krupp is known for different technologies, which range from heavy industries to 
elevators. Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems, which is its business unit that is part of the 
business area Industrial Solutions, has three ship yards in Germany. On its website 
https://www.thyssenkrupp-marinesystems.com/de/, it shows pictures of different 
warships. Thyssen Krupp Marine systems produced submarines, frigates, and corvettes 
for the German navy. The latest ships that were purchased from Thyssen Krupp Marine 
Systems include the new class 125 frigates. A press release of Thyssen Krupp Marine 
Systems states that, “one third of four 125 class frigates for the German Navy was laid 
down today at the Hamburg site of Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems, a company of 
ThyssenKrupp Industrial Solutions” (Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems, 2014). This shows 
that Thyssen Krupp, along with its business unit Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems, is a 
German defense contractor.  
(2) Tognom AG 
Tognum AG owned the MTU Friedrichshafen GmbH before it was renamed into 
Rolls Royce Power Systems, which is now owned by Rolls Royce and Daimler. Rolls 
Royce Power Systems was formed in 2012. MTU Friedrichshafen provided engines for 
many ships of the German Navy and for German battle tanks, such as the Leopard I and 
Leopard II. MTU refers to the use of its engines in these battle tanks on its website 
www.mtu-online.com, and the company offers propulsion engines for navy ships. This 
data demonstrates that Tognum AG, along with its subsidiary MTU, is a German defense 
contractor. 
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(3) Renk AG 
Renk AG is a producer of gear sets for marine vessels and other propulsion 
systems. Along with the German Navy, the U.S. Navy also uses Renk gear sets in their 
new Littoral Combat Ships. In one of its 2012 press releases, Renk AG refers to the new 
125 class frigates of the German Navy, and shows the gear set of the ships (Renk AG, 
2012). This demonstrates that Renk AG is a contractor of the German Navy. 
(4) Daimler AG 
The Daimler AG is one of the world’s leading producers of cars, busses, and 
trucks. According to its website www.daimler.com, Daimler owns different brand names 
under which they distribute their products across the world. Besides Mercedes-Benz, 
Daimler also owns the brands Smart, Freightliner, Western Star, and Thomas Build 
Busses. The German Armed Forces use trucks produced by the Daimler AG in 
specialized military versions as well as civil versions. In 2012, Daimler received a 
contract to deliver 110 trucks to the German Armed Forces (Daimler Communications, 
2012).  
(5) Rheinmetall AG 
Rheinmetall is one of the traditional producers of armored vehicles, large guns, 
and ammunition. Further, Rheinmetall is also a supplier of automotive parts to car 
producers. The German armed forces purchased several products from this company, the 
latest purchase being that of the infantry fighting vehicle Puma. In a press release, 
Rheinmetall stated that “by the end of 2020, the Bundeswehr will have taken delivery of 
350—between 40 and 60 every year—of these armored vehicles to replace the 
MARDER” (Rheinmetall AG, n.d.).  
(6) MTU Aero Engines AG 
MTU Aero Engines maintains and produces engines for civil and military aircraft. 
Besides its own engines, the company also maintains engines produced by Rolls Royce 
and General Electrics for customers all over the world. In a 2012 press release, the 
celebration of 10 years of cooperation with the German Air Force is described. It is stated 
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that MTU maintains the engines of the Eurofighter and the Tornado fighting jets for the 
German armed forces (MTU Aero Engines AG, 2012). This demonstrates that MTU Aero 
Engines is a German defense contractor. 
(7) OHB AG 
OHB is a producer of space systems and aeronautical products. On its 
www.ohb.de website, the company states that it is the largest German supplier for the 
European Ariane 5 rocket that is frequently used to carry cargo to an orbit around the 
earth. For the German armed forces, OHB develops satellites and other space technology. 
In a press release of 2013, the company states that it “signed a contract with the Federal 
Office of Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support of the Bundeswehr 
(BAAINBw) for the development and integration of the ‘SARah satellite-based radar 
reconnaissance system” (OHB System AG, 2013). Hence, OHB is a German defense 
contractor. 
(8) Drägerwerk AG 
Dräger is a producer of protection and medical equipment for civil and military 
applications. They offer test sets for the police to detect driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs, protection equipment for individuals and groups against chemical and 
biological threats, equipment for divers, and equipment to monitor medical treatments of 
people. The German armed forces purchased their standard equipment for the protection 
of soldiers against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) threats from Dräger. In a 
2011 brochure, Dräger also shows other equipment that is used by the German armed 
forces (Drägerwerk AG, 2011).  
(9) CONET Technologies AG 
CONET Technologies provides consulting services, IT solutions, software 
engineering, and IT staffing services. According to a 2013 press release, CONET 
provides a Computer-Aided Testing (CAT) system to the German armed forces. This 
system is used for “the running of various psychological testing procedures and is 
currently in use at the German Armed Forces Bundeswehr” (CONET Technologies AG, 
2013).  
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(10) LS telcom AG 
LS telcom is a specialist of frequency management technology in ground-based 
and satellite communications. In 2006, the German armed forces awarded a contract to 
implement German systems into the NATO ARCADE system (LS telcom AG, 2006). 
Since LS Telcom still offers products for military applications, the assumption that this 
company is still a German defense contractor is justified.  
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
This section describes the statistical methodology used for data analysis. After 
extracting the accounting data from the Compustat database, we used the software 
Microsoft Excel 2010 to analyze them. To automate the process, we programmed macros 
with Microsoft Excel using Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications. The three steps used 
to analyze the data include: (1) extracting all data sets of the same industry from the raw 
data; (2) matching year and size to find industry-year-size matches for each sample year; 
and (3) comparing the profitability of each sample year with its match. The following 
subsections describe each step. 
1. Matching the Industry 
The first step is to group companies of the same industry. We use SIC to identify 
the industry. In different experiments, we use two-digit, three-digit, and four-digit SIC, 
respectively.  
Naturally, the number of same-industry matches decreased when more digits were 
used because a higher digit SIC represents a more narrowly defined industry group. This 
decrease is even more pronounced in Germany, because many German companies are 
small and medium-sized firms, hence, are not publically traded. Additionally, Germany’s 
economy is smaller compared to the United States. This leaves even fewer publically-
traded companies in our sample, and the number of available matches decreases 
significantly once we pass two-digit SIC.  
We extracted all companies that had the same SIC as the defense contractor, 
which was examined, to a new MS Excel spreadsheet. This new spreadsheet contained 
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only companies of the same industry and was used for further analysis. To ensure that the 
benchmark firms were non-defense contractors, we manually deleted other defense 
contractors from the resulting spreadsheet. The first step of our analysis, to match the 
industry, was complete. 
2. Matching Year and Size 
To identify a match between the two companies—one is our sample firm that is a 
defense contractor, and the other is the benchmark firm that is used to infer our sample 
firm’s normal profit in the absence of defense contracts—the fiscal years that are 
compared must be the same. In addition, the size measure of both companies must be as 
close as possible. Hence, the next step is to sort the data in the spreadsheet generated in 
the first step by fiscal year and size measure.  
Size measures were either total assets or total revenues. These were the same 
measures that were used by Wang and San Miguel (2012). We analyzed the results for 
companies matched by total assets and revenues separately. In addition, different 
methods to identify the closest match in size were used. We used the next smaller, the 
next bigger, the absolute difference, or a ratio to identify the closest match. 
To identify the next smaller company as our sample firm’s benchmark firm, we 
used the company that had the next smaller number in total assets or revenues, depending 
on the actual size measure. When there was no smaller company in the fiscal year, no 
match was found for the sample firm, and the data set of that fiscal year of the sample 
firm was not used for further analysis. 
Similarly, the next bigger company was identified. The company that had the next 
bigger number in terms of revenue or total assets was used for further analysis. When no 
bigger company existed for the fiscal year, the data set of the sample firm was not used 
for further analysis. 
The absolute difference criterion refers to the comparison of the size difference 
between the next bigger company and the sample firm with the size difference of the next 
smaller company to the sample firm. The company that yielded the smallest absolute 
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number for this difference was chosen to conduct further analysis. When only a bigger 
company but no smaller existed for the fiscal year, the bigger company was chosen. 
Similarly, the smaller company was chosen as the best size match when only a smaller 
but no bigger company was identified for a fiscal year. When neither a smaller nor a 
bigger company existed, the data set of the sample firm for that fiscal year was not used 
for further analysis.  
The ratio comparison of company size compares the relative size of two 
companies. The two ratios of size measures that are compared to each other are shown in 
Equation (10) and Equation (11). Note that the bigger company is always in the 
numerator and the smaller company goes to the denominator. 
 
_ _ _ _
_1
_
Size Measure next bigger company
Ratio
Size Measure_sample_firm




_ _ _ _
Size Measure sample firm
Ratio
Size Measure next smaller company
   (11) 
The benchmark company is the one that yields the smaller ratio. When only a 
smaller or only a bigger company existed for one fiscal year, this company was 
automatically chosen as the best size match. When neither a bigger nor a smaller 
company existed, the data of the sample firm for that fiscal year was not used for further 
analysis.  
The ratio measure is especially useful when there are huge size differences 
between companies. Consider the case where a sample firm has total assets of €100 
Million, while the next bigger company reports total assets of €250 Million, and the next 
smaller company reports total assets of €2 Million. Using the minimum absolute 
difference matching would yield a €98 Million difference for the next smaller company 
and €150 Million difference for the next bigger company. Hence, the next smaller 
company (i.e., €2 Million firm) would be chosen as the best size match, while common 
sense would indicate that the €250 Million company should be a better choice. Using the 
lower ratio approach would avoid this problem because the sample firm was 50 times as 
big as the next smaller firm, while the next bigger firm was only 2.5 times as big as the 
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sample firm. Hence, the next bigger firm would be used as the best size match because its 
size ratio was smaller compared to the size ratio of the next smaller company. Therefore, 
the ratio is a better method for the comparison of size when huge differences in size are 
present, which was the case for the German setting. 
In order to assess the quality of the size match, we introduce the size match ratio 
MR, which indicates the relative size of the next bigger company to the next smaller 
company, as defined by Equation (8). A smaller MR indicates a better size match, while a 
higher MR indicates a poorer size match. MR is always larger than 1.0 because the bigger 




size measure bigger company
MR
size measure smaller company
   (12) 
Once the industry-year-size matches for a sample firm were identified for each 
available fiscal year, the data sets of the sample firm were combined with the chosen 
match and copied to a new spreadsheet. Next, the profitability measures ROA, ROCE, 
PMR, and OMR were calculated for the sample firm and the matching firm. 
3. Comparison of Profitability 
To calculate the excessive profits for each sample firm-year, the profitability 
measures of the matching firm-year was subtracted from the same profitability measure 
of the sample firm-year. A positive value for this difference means that the sample firm 
achieved a better profitability in the fiscal year compared to the matching firm. A 
negative value is interpreted as a better performance by the matching firm.  
When all available industry-year-size matches for all sample firms were 
identified, the next step was to consolidate the data of all sample firm-years. These 
consolidated data were analyzed statistically by calculating the mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum of the difference between the profitability measures.  
As described in Keller (2009, pp. 382–391), t-tests were used to explore the 
statistical significance of our findings. We used a one-tailed t-test to investigate whether 
the population mean µ of the excessive profits based on each profitability measure was 
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zero, which indicated that German defense contractors did not earn excessive profits, or 
larger than zero, which indicated that German defense contractors did earn excessive 
profits. The null hypothesis H0 and the alternative hypothesis H1 are shown in Equations 
(13) and (14). 
 0 0: 0H     (13) 
 1 1: 0H     (14) 








   (15) 
In Equation (15), x  is the arithmetic mean of the sample, µ is the population 
mean as defined by the null hypothesis shown in Equation (13), s is the standard 
deviation of the sample, and n is the sample size. When t was calculated, the p-value was 
identified as the area right to t under the curve of the student t-distribution. We used ν = 
n-1 degrees of freedom for that purpose. Keller defines “the p-value is the probability of 
observing a test statistic at least as extreme as the one computed given that the null 
hypothesis is true” (2009, p. 353). When this definition is applied to the object of this 
thesis, a high p-value would indicate that the null hypothesis H0 cannot be rejected, 
which does not mean that it is accepted. When the p-value is low, the null hypothesis H0 
has to be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis H1, which means that there is 
statistical evidence that German defense contractors earn excessive profits. The p-value 
was identified using the MS Excel 2010 spreadsheet function T.DIST.RT (t, ν). The 
statistical significance of our findings was determined by interpreting the p-value as 
shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6.   Interpretation of the p-value (from Keller, 2009, p. 355, Figure 
11.6.) 
p-value Statistical Interpretation 
p > 0.1 there is no statistical evidence for a better performance by German 
defense contractors 
0.05 < p < 0.1 there is weak statistical evidence for a better performance by German 
defense contractors 
0.01 < p < 0.05 there is strong statistical evidence for a better performance by German 
defense contractors 
p < 0.01 there is overwhelming statistical evidence for a better performance by 
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IV. FINDINGS 
The methodology that was applied for this research was described in Chapter III. 
This chapter presents the findings. First, the numerical results are shown in Section A. 
Section B gives the statistical interpretation of the numbers presented in the first section. 
Section C evaluates the economic significance of our findings. The final Section D 
compares the findings for German defense contractors with Wang and San Miguel’s 
(2012) findings for U.S. defense contractors. 
A. NUMERIC RESULTS 
This section presents the numeric results of our experiments. The findings based 
on two various profitability measures (i.e., ROA, and ROCE) are reported in subsequent 
subsections, respectively. For each of the two individual profitability measures, we have 
three specifications for the industry matching method (i.e., two-digit, three-digit, and 
four-digit SIC code), two size measures, (i.e., revenue and total assets), and four criteria 
to determine the best size match as described in Chapter III.C.2. We use tables to show 
the numeric results. 
1. Numeric Results for ROA 
Our findings for the rate of return on assets (ROA) are shown in Tables 7, 8, and 
9 (corresponding to two-digit, three-digit, and four-digit SIC code, respectively), with 
Panel A (Panel B) of each table presenting the results for the scenario where size is 
measured by total assets (revenues). Within each panel, there are four columns reporting 
the results for four different criteria to determine the best size match of a company. These 
four criteria are next smaller, next bigger, the closest in size, and the smaller ratio (please 
refer to Chapter III.C.2). Under each column, we report the basic statistics for excessive 
ROA across our sample, where the excessive ROA is defined as the difference in ROA 
between a sample defense contractor firm and its industry-year-size matched firm. Mean 
and median show the central tendency of the difference in ROA. The minimum, 
maximum, and standard deviation are used to present the spread of the data. The sample 
size n demonstrates how many matches were actually found, when the special method of 
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determining the industry-year-size match was used. The p-value shows the statistical 
significance of the hypothesis test that is discussed in Chapter III.C.3.  
Table 7 shows that, when the company size is determined by total assets, the 
mean of excessive ROA ranges from 1.44% to 3.80%, depending on the method used to 
determine the best size match. The p-value of the t-tests ranges from 0.0075 to 0.0967. 
When revenues are used to determine the company size, the mean of excessive ROA of 
the defense contractors ranges from -0.13% to 1.31%. The p-values for the t-tests range 
from 0.1962 to 0.5569. 
Table 7.   Numeric results for excessive ROA using the two-digit SIC code to 












Panel A: Excessive ROA, company size is determined by Total Assets 
Mean 2.36% 3.80% 1.92% 1.44% 
Median  0.08% 1.27% 0.32% -0.005% 
Minimum -30.30% -35.42% -35.42% -35.42% 
Maximum 69.74% 43.46% 43.46% 43.46% 
Standard 
deviation 
13.31% 12.93% 11.74% 10.99% 
sample size n 100 72 100 100 
p-value 0.0395** 0.0075*** 0.0525* 0.0967* 
Panel B: Excessive ROA, size is determined by Revenue 
Mean -0.13% 1.31% 0.48% -0.03% 
Median -0.13% 0.40% -0.13% -0.36% 
Minimum -34.83% -33.55% -27.75% -27.75% 
Maximum 23.22% 57.54% 26.18% 26.18% 
Standard 
deviation 
9.21% 12.90% 8.97% 9.06% 
sample size n 98 72 99 99 
p-value 0.5569 0.1962 0.2998 0.5146 
* indicates 10% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; *** indicates 
1% significance level 
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For the size measure total assets, Table 8 displays values between 0.16% and 
1.36% for the mean of excessive ROA, depending on the method used to determine the 
best size match. The p-values range from 0.0839 to 0.4497. When revenues is used to 
determine the company size, the mean of excessive ROA ranges from -0.07% to 1.54%. 
The p-values of the hypothesis test range from 0.2431 to 0.5294. 
Table 8.   Numeric results for excessive ROA using the three-digit SIC code 











Panel A: Excessive ROA, company Size is determined by Total Assets 
Mean 1.36% 3.41% 0.16% 0.32% 
Median -0.49% 0.11% -0.19% -0.19% 
Minimum -28.34% -35.42% -35.42% -35.42% 
Maximum 69.74% 50.75% 43.46% 43.46% 
Standard 
deviation 
14.30% 15.94% 10.83% 10.55% 
sample size n 73 43 73 73 
p-value 0.2096 0.0839* 0.4497 0.3996 
Panel B: Excessive ROA, company Size is determined by Revenue 
Mean 0.61% 1.54% -0.07% 0.19% 
Median 0.40% 14.59% -0.13% -0.15% 
Minimum -27.75% -33.55% -27.75% -27.75% 
Maximum 31.75% 50.75% 31.75% 34.86% 
Standard 
deviation 
7.68% 14.59% 7.95% 8.95% 
sample size n 72 44 72 72 
p-value 0.2527 0.2431 0.5294 0.4295 
* indicates 10 % significance level 
 
As shown in Table 9, the difference between ROA ranges from -2.01% to 0.47% 
when the company size is determined by total assets. The p-values range from 0.4282 to 
0.9381. The mean of excessive ROA ranges from -0.16% to 1.28% when revenues is 
used to determine the company size. The p-values range from 0.3144 to 0.5451. 
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Table 9.   Numeric results for excessive ROA using the four-digit SIC code 











Panel A: Excessive ROA, company size is determined by Total Assets 
Mean -0.56% 0.47% -2.01% -1.86% 
Median -0.80% -0.95% -0.87% -1.10% 
Minimum -69.45% -35.42% -35.42% -35.42% 
Maximum 82.94% 50.75% 38.75% 38.75% 
Standard 
deviation 
16.54% 16.78% 11.04% 11.96% 
sample size n 73 43 73 73 
p-value 0.6125 0.4282 0.9381 0.9062 
Panel B: Excessive ROA, company Size is determined by Revenue 
Mean -0.16% 1.28% 0.13% 0.33% 
Median -0.13% -1.00% -0.13% -0.73% 
Minimum -69.45% -39.16% -30.18% -30.18% 
Maximum 40.95% 67.32% 67.32% 67.32% 
Standard 
deviation 
12.34% 17.44% 11.66% 12.17% 
sample size n 73 44 73 73 
p-value 0.5451 0.3144 0.4608 0.4082 
 
2. Numeric Results for ROCE 
This subsection presents the numerical results of our analysis for return on 
common shareholder’s equity (ROCE). Tables 10, 11, and 12 parallel Tables 7, 8, and 9, 
except that we change the profitability measure from ROA to ROCE.  
Panel A of Table 10 shows that the mean of excessive ROCE ranges from  
-10.81% to 17.70% when the company size is determined by total assets. Depending on 
the method that was used to determine the best size match, the p-values range from 
0.0007 to 0.0133. The mean of the difference between ROCE ranges from 6.72% to 
31.84% when revenues is used to determine the company size. The p-values of the t-test 
range from 0.0924 to 0.1217. The maxima for the three size matching methods next 
bigger company, minimum absolute difference, and smallest ratio have an extreme value 
of 1668.09%. This value stems from the comparison of the defense contractor Renk AG 
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with its peer company NORDEX SE in the fiscal year 2004. The size match ratio MR for 
this example is 1.031, which means that, in terms of revenue, NORDEX was only 3.1% 
larger than Renk. This is a good size match; but the profitability measure ROCE differs 
significantly. 
Table 10.   Numeric results for excessive ROCE using the two-digit SIC code 











Panel A: Excessive ROE, company size is determined by Total Assets 
Mean 13.53% 17.70% 11.84% 10.81% 
Median 4.50% 6.96% 4.33% 3.46% 
Minimum -128.42% -41.86% -128.42% -128.42% 
Maximum 378.01% 263.20% 264.96% 264.96% 
Standard 
deviation 
60.11% 44.95% 46.85% 46.56% 
sample size n 100 71 99 99 
p-value 0.0133** 0.0007*** 0.0068*** 0.0115** 
Panel B: Excessive ROCE, company size is determined by Revenue 
Mean 6.72% 31.84% 21.72% 20.34% 
Median 4.01% 0.30% 3.46% 1.02% 
Minimum -152.71% -39.99% -152.71% -152.71% 
Maximum 264.96% 1668.09% 1668.09% 1668.09% 
Standard 
deviation 
49.84% 201.62% 172.40% 172.48% 
sample size n 98 71 99 99 
p-value 0.0924* 0.0938* 0.1065 0.1217 
* indicates 10% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; *** indicates 
1% significance level 
 
As shown in Table 11, the mean of the difference between ROCE ranges from 
6.75% to 10.91% when the company size is determined by total assets. The p-values of 
the t-tests range from 0.0071 to 0.0646. When revenues are used to determine the 
company size, the mean of excessive ROCE ranges from 4.46% to 6.45%. The p-values 
range from 0.0959 to 0.1630. 
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Table 11.   Numeric results for excessive ROCE using the three-digit SIC 











Panel A: Excessive ROCE, company size is determined by Total Assets 
Mean 9.76% 10.91% 5.72% 6.75% 
Median 2.90% 2.55% 3.05% 2.99% 
Minimum -102.04% -41.86% -46.10% -41.86% 
Maximum 378.01% 146.76% 112.77% 112.77% 
Standard 
deviation 
54.30% 36.56% 22.88% 22.79% 
sample size n 73 42 72 72 
p-value 0.0646* 0.0301** 0.0187** 0.0071*** 
Panel B: Excessive ROCE, company size is determined by Revenue 
Mean 6.03% 5.52% 4.46% 6.45% 
Median 4.32% -0.01% 2.73% 2.73% 
Minimum -156.00% -39.99% -156.00% -156.00% 
Maximum 205.31% 146.76% 205.31% 205.31% 
Standard 
deviation 
39.36% 33.77% 39.82% 41.56% 
sample size n 72 43 72 72 
p-value 0.0990* 0.1449 0.1630 0.0959* 
* indicates 10% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; *** indicates 
1% significance level 
 
Table 12 demonstrates that the mean of the difference between ROCE ranges 
from 1.27% to 6.28% when the company size is determined by total assets. The p-values 
of the t-tests range from 0.0995 to 0.3470. The mean of excessive ROCE ranges from -
2.84% to 5.43% when revenues are used to determine the company size. The p-values 
range from 0.1230 to 0.6179. 
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Table 12.   Numeric results for excessive ROCE using the four-digit SIC code 











Panel A: Company Size is determined by Total Assets 
Mean 6.28% 4.36% 1.27% 2.71% 
Median 1.24% -2.09% 1.24% 1.24% 
Minimum -113.83% -93.23% -93.23% -93.23% 
Maximum 206.49% 146.76% 112.77% 116.44% 
Standard 
deviation 
41.09% 43.17% 27.49% 30.21% 
sample size n 72 43 73 73 
p-value 0.0995* 0.2558 0.3470 0.2232 
Panel B: Company Size is determined by Revenue 
Mean 5.00% 5.43% -2.84% 5.81% 
Median 2.09% -1.84% 1.25% 0.30% 
Minimum -589.53% -51.37% -589.53% -156.00% 
Maximum 492.69% 146.76% 205.31% 205.31% 
Standard 
deviation 
101.22% 37.17% 80.55% 42.44% 
sample size n 73 44 73 73 
p-value 0.3370 0.1689 0.6179 0.1230 
* indicates 10% significance level 
 
B. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
This section discusses the statistical significance of the numerical results, which 
were presented in Section A of this chapter. First, the quality of the sample and of the 
size match will be discussed. The following subsections show the statistical interpretation 
of the numerical results for ROA, ROCE, and other profitability measures. Last, our 
statistical interpretations are summarized. 
1. Sample Size and Quality of the Size Matches 
In this subsection, we demonstrate how the use of a four-digit, three-digit, or two-
digit SIC to match the industry affected our sample size and the quality of the size match 
criterion.  
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The use of the three-digit and four-digit SIC to determine the industry match 
reduces the sample size significantly. Table 13 demonstrates that using three-digit or 
four-digit SIC sharply reduces sample size by 27 or 27%. This reduction of the sample 
size reduces the power of the hypothesis test significantly. The power of the test is 
defined as the ability to correctly reject the null-hypothesis. Less power means that it is 
less likely that the null-hypothesis is rejected even though the alternative hypothesis is 
true; so when we go to higher digits SIC, we lose samples, and the power of the test 
suffers accordingly. 











Total Assets,  
absolute difference 
100 73 73 
Total Assets,  
ratio 
100 73 73 
Revenue,  
absolute difference 
99 73 73 
Revenue,  
ratio 
99 73 73 
 
In order to determine the quality of the size match in our sample, we used the Size 
Match Ratio MR as defined in Chapter II.A.3. We used the percentage of observations 
that fall into the defined ranges of MR to normalize the numbers and to neutralize effects 
from different sample sizes. Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 show the distribution of the identified 
matches for different ranges of MR. For all industry matching methods; more than 50% 
of all identified matches are smaller than two. This means that the majority of the 
matches used for our study are good size matches. When more digits of the SIC are used 
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to determine the industry match, the percentage of observation that have a MR that is 
larger than 10 increases significantly. This undermines the size dimension of the 
industry-year-size match for those matches. 
 
Figure 2.  Size Match Ratio for the different industry matching methods, the 
company size was determined by Total assets using the absolute 
difference to determine the best size match. 
 
Figure 3.  Size Match Ratio for the different industry matching methods, the 
company size was determined by Total assets using the ratio method to 
determine the best size match. 
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Figure 4.  Size Match Ratio for the different industry matching methods, the 
company size was determined by revenue using the absolute difference 
to determine the best size match. 
 
Figure 5.  Size Match Ratio for the different industry matching methods, the 
company size was determined by revenue using the ratio method to 
determine the best size match. 
For the German setting, the two-digit SIC code is the best method to determine 
the industry match dimension of the industry-year-size match because the sample size is 
bigger and the quality of company size matches is best. As shown above, the sample size 
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significantly decreases when more than two digits of the SIC are used to determine the 
industry. In addition, a higher percentage of matches has a size match ratio that is larger 
than 10. Using more than two digits of the SIC to determine the industry match reduces 
the power of the hypothesis test and undermines the size match dimension of the 
industry-year-size match method to find benchmark firms for defense contractors. 
2. Statistical Interpretation of the Numeric Results for ROA 
This subsection statistically interprets the numeric results for ROA, which were 
presented in Section A.1 of this chapter. First, the findings for ROA when the first two 
digits of the SIC were used to define the industry match are shown. Next, the findings 
when the first three digits of the SIC were used are interpreted. Last, the numbers of the 
results when the four-digit SIC was used to define the industry are discussed. A short 
summary concludes this subsection. 
As shown in panel A of Table 7, the mean for the difference between ROA of 
German defense contractors and their benchmark firms is larger than zero for all methods 
to define the best size match when the company size is determined by total assets. The 
median is also larger than zero or, when the ratio method was used to define the best size 
match, very close to zero. This shows that, on average, German defense contractors earn 
more profits as measured by ROA when total assets is used to determine the company 
size.  
This finding is supported by the t-test. When the next bigger company is used as 
the best size match, the p-value of 0.0075 shows that there is overwhelming statistical 
evidence that German defense contractors earn better profits compared to their industry 
peers. The null-hypothesis, which states that there is no difference in the profitability of 
German defense contractors compared to their industry peers, is rejected in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis, which states that German defense contractors earn excessive 
profits. When the next smaller company is used to find the best industry match, we find 
strong statistical evidence for excessive profits of German defense contractors. When the 
absolute difference and the ratio method are used to define the best size match, there is 
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still weak statistical evidence for excessive profits of German defense contractors. In all 
cases, the null-hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis. 
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results for the difference between ROA when the 
company size is determined by revenues. When the next bigger company or the absolute 
difference are used to determine the best size match, the mean of the difference is larger 
than zero, but smaller compared to the means when the company size is determined by 
total assets. When the next smaller company and the ratio method are used to find the 
best size match, we find small negative numbers for the mean. For the three size-match 
methods next smaller company, absolute difference, and ratio method, the median is 
smaller than zero. Only when the next bigger company is used to determine the best size 
match, the median is still larger than zero. A negative difference between ROA means 
that the defense contractors are less profitable than their industry peers. The results of the 
t-test show that there is no statistical evidence that German defense contractors earn 
excessive profits. The null-hypothesis is not rejected, which does not mean that the null-
hypothesis is accepted.  
Panel A of Table 8, which presents results of ROA for the three-digit industry 
match, shows that the mean of the difference between ROA of defense contractors and 
their industry peers is larger than zero for all methods to find the best size match when 
the company size is determined by total assets. In contrast, the median is negative for all 
methods to determine the best size match except when the next bigger company is used. 
The p-value of 0.0839 when the best size match is the next bigger company is interpreted 
as weak statistical evidence for excessive profits of German defense contractors. For the 
other methods to find the best size match there is not enough statistical evidence to reject 
the null-hypothesis.  
Panel B of Table 8 shows that the mean of the difference between ROA is still 
larger than zero for three of four methods to determine the best size match when the 
company size is determined by revenues. The median is larger than zero for two of the 
four methods to find the best size match. The p-values, however, show that there is not 
enough statistical evidence for excessive profits of German defense contractors, when the 
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first three digits of the SIC are used to determine the industry, and when revenues is used 
to define company size.  
When the four-digit SIC is used to define the industry, we cannot find any 
evidence for excessive profits of German defense contractors. The median is smaller than 
zero for all methods to determine the best size match and for both size measures. The 
mean is smaller than zero when total assets are used to define the industry and for all 
methods to find the best size match except when the next bigger company is used. Table 
9 shows further, that the mean of the difference between ROA of defense contractors and 
ROA of their industry peers is larger than zero for all methods to determine the best size 
match except when the next smaller company is used. For all methods to determine 
company size and for all methods to find the best size match, there is not enough 
statistical evidence for excessive profits of German defense contractors. 
To summarize, we found statistical evidence for excessive profits of German 
defense contractors when the company size is determined by total assets and when the 
first two digits are used to determine the industry. In all other cases, the t-tests did not 
provide enough evidence to reject the null-hypothesis. In Subsection 1 of this section, we 
showed that the two-digit SIC is the best method to determine the industry match for the 
German setting. Therefore, our findings for this industry matching method should 
outweigh the other findings. Additionally, ROA is a profitability measure that relates 
profit to total assets, which makes total assets the logical size measure when profitability 
is measured by ROA. 
3. Statistical Interpretation of the Numeric Results for ROCE 
This subsection shows the statistical interpretation of our findings for ROCE. As 
for ROA, first the findings for ROCE are discussed when the first two digits of the SIC 
are used to define the industry, followed by the interpretation of the results for the three 
and four digit SIC. At the end of this subsection, the results are summarized. 
As shown in Table 10, the mean of the difference between the ROCE of defense 
contractors and their industry peers ranges from 10.81% to 17.70% when the two-digit 
SIC is used to define the industry and total assets is the size measure of the company. For 
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this case, the median ranges from 3.46% to 6.96%, depending on the method to find the 
best size match. The p-values of for the two size matching methods next bigger company 
and absolute difference lead to the conclusion that there is overwhelming statistical 
evidence for excessive profits of German defense contractors. When the next smaller 
company and the ratio method are used to find the best size match, we still observe strong 
statistical evidence for excessive profits of German defense contractors in terms of 
ROCE.  
Panel B of Table 10 shows the results for the difference between ROCE when 
revenues is the size measure of companies. The mean of this difference ranges from 
6.72% to 31.84%. The median ranges from 0.30% to 4.01%. When the next bigger and 
the next smaller company are used to determine the best size match, we observe weak 
statistical evidence for excessive profits of German defense contractors, when profit is 
measured by ROCE. Using the absolute difference and the ratio method to determine the 
best size match does not provide enough statistical evidence to reject the null-hypothesis.  
When the first three digits of the SIC are used to determine the industry, the 
average of the mean in the difference between ROCE of defense contractors and their 
industry peers ranges from 5.72% to 10.91% for total assets as measure for the size of 
companies. The results in panel A of Table 11 further show that the median ranges from 
2.55% to 3.05%. The t-test reveals that there is overwhelming statistical evidence for 
excessive profitability of German defense contractors when the ratio method is used to 
determine the best size match and when total assets is the measure of company size. 
When the next bigger company and the absolute difference are used to determine the best 
size match, there is strong statistical evidence for excessive profits of German defense 
contractors. When the next smaller company is the best size match for defense 
contractors, there is still weak statistical evidence for excessive profits in terms of ROCE. 
When the first three digits of the SIC are used to define the industry and revenue 
is the size measure of the companies, the mean of the difference between ROCE of 
defense contractors and their matching companies ranges from 4.46% to 6.45%. As 
shown in panel B of Table 11, the median ranges from -0.01% to 4.32%. The p-values for 
the ratio method to find the best size match and the next smaller company as the best size 
 51 
match reveal that our sample provides weak statistical evidence for excessive profits of 
German defense contractors. For the remaining two methods to define the best size match 
there was not enough statistical evidence to reject the null-hypothesis. 
When all four digits of the SIC are used to define the industry, the mean of the 
difference between ROCE ranges from -2.84% to 6.28% for both size measures and all 
four methods to determine the best size match. Table 12 also shows that the median 
ranges from -2.09% to 2.09%. Only when the number of total assets is the size measure 
and the next smaller company is used as benchmark firm, there is weak statistical 
evidence for excessive profits of German defense contractors. In all other cases, there is 
not enough statistical evidence to infer that German defense contractors earn excessive 
profits.  
To conclude, we observed statistical evidence for excessive profits of German 
defense contractors when profitability is measured by ROCE, and the first two and first 
three digits of the SIC are used to define the industry. There is stronger statistical 
evidence for excessive profits when total assets are the size measure of the company 
compared to the results when revenue is the size measure. Again, statistical evidence 
could not be found when all four digits of the SIC are used to define the industry. As 
shown in Subsection 1 of this section (“Sample Size and Quality of Size Matches”), the 
best method to define the industry for the German setting is the two-digit SIC. More 
digits have negative effects on the sample size and the quality of the size match. We use 
our findings for industry matches defined by the first two digits of the SIC to infer that 
there is sufficient statistical evidence to infer that, in terms of ROCE, German defense 
contractors earn excessive profits. 
4. Other Profitability Measures 
We performed similar analyses based on two alternative profit measures, namely, 
PMR and OMR. Untabulated results (available upon requests) show that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the profitability of defense contractors and that 
of their peers. However, the lack of evidence could be due to the small sample size of 
German defense contractors, which reduced the power of the hypothesis test.  
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5. Summary of the Statistical Interpretation 
This subsection provides the conclusion drawn from our statistical analysis of the 
different measures of profitability for German defense contractors and their benchmarks, 
which were identified by using the industry-year-size match. We found that German 
defense contractors earned excessive profits, based on the profitability measures ROA 
and ROCE. As discussed in Subsection 1 of this section, we found that the best method to 
determine the industry match is to use the first two digits of the SIC. For this reason, we 
draw our conclusion based on this method of defining the industry.  
For ROA and ROCE we found statistical evidence that German defense 
contractors earn excessive profits when the reported number for total assets is used to 
determine the company size. This finding is not supported when revenues is used to 
determine the company size. ROA is a profitability measure, which is based on total 
assets. For this measure of profitability, total assets are a good measure for company size. 
The fact that we were not able to reject the null-hypothesis when revenues are used to 
define the company size does not mean that we accept the null-hypothesis. Based on our 
findings we infer that German defense contractors earn excessive profits when 
profitability is measured by ROA and ROCE. 
C. ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE 
This section compares the differences of the profitability measures with the actual 
profitability measures of defense contractors and their benchmark firms. When the 
difference of the profitability measures makes up a significant part of the original 
profitability measures, the excessive profits are economically significant. If the difference 
is only a small part of the original profitability measures, excessive profits are 
economically less significant.  
Table 14 shows the mean of the profitability measures ROA and ROCE of 
defense contractors, benchmark firms, and the difference of these profitability measures 
when the two-digit SIC was used to define the industry. The comparison of the 
differences in profitability and the profitability of defense contractors and benchmark 
firms shows that the difference is always a significant portion of the profitability 
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measure. This means that the difference in profitability of defense contractors and their 
benchmark firms cannot be rejected as insignificant and shows that there is an 
economical significant difference between profitability of defense contractors and 
benchmark firms. 
Table 14.   Average profitability and difference in profitability of defense 
contractors and benchmark firms. 












Panel A: Best size match by choosing the next smaller company 
ROA 2.69% 0.32% 2.36% 2.67% 2.78% -0.13% 
ROC
E 
11.61% -1.92% 13.53% 11.62% 4.59% 6.72% 
Panel B: Best size match by choosing the next bigger company 
ROA 3.15% -0.69% 3.80% 3.15% 1.80% 1.31% 
ROC
E 
14.80% -2.63% 17.70% 14.80% -16.77% 31.84% 
Panel C: Best size match by determining the smallest absolute difference 
ROA 2.67% 0.72% 1.92% 2.67% 2.13% 0.48% 
ROC
E 
11.51% -0.20% 11.84% 11.51% -10.22% 21.72% 
Panel D: Best size match by ratio method 
ROA 2.67% 1.20% 1.44% 2.67% 2.64% -0.03% 
ROC
E 
11.51% 0.82% 10.81% 11.51% -8.82% 20.34% 
 
D. COMPARISON OF EXCESSIVE PROFITS OF GERMAN AND U.S. 
DEFENSE CONTRACTORS 
This section compares the findings for German defense contractors with the 
findings of Wang and San Miguel (2012) for U.S. defense contractors. First, the data 
source and sample size are compared. Second, the results of both studies are discussed. 
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Last, differences and commonalities of the findings for German defense contractors and 
U.S. defense contractors are summarized. 
Wang and San Miguel (2012) were able to use data provided by the U.S. 
government to identify defense contractors while such data are not provided by the 
German government. In addition, the Compustat database provides annual fundamentals 
beginning as early as 1950 for U.S. companies, while data for international companies are 
only available starting in 1989. These two facts resulted in significantly different sample 
sizes. Wang and San Miguel (2012) identified 112 publically traded U.S. defense 
contractors and 4,099 firm years for their study. In contrast, only 10 German defense 
contractors were identified, which yielded data for up to 170 firm years. Based on these 
numbers, the power of the hypothesis test for German defense contractors is significantly 
lower.  
Other reasons for the low number of identified defense contractors compared to 
the study for U.S. defense contractors are differences in structure and size of the German 
industry compared to the U.S. industry, and the difference in the size of defense budgets. 
According to The World Bank, the 2013 GDP of the United States was $16.8 Trillion 
while the German GDP for the same year was $3.6 Trillion (2014). These numbers show 
that both economies are different in size. Additionally, the backbone of the German 
industry is small and medium sized companies. This is true for the German industry in 
total and for the German defense industry. Most of these companies are not publically 
traded, which reduces the data base for our study. As shown in Chapter II.B.3, the 
German defense budget for 2013 was €33.26 Billion, which are approximately $44.57 
Billion. The U.S defense budget proposal by President Obama for the same year was 
$613.9 Billion (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012). This difference in budget is 
connected to fewer defense contracts by the German government.  
To facilitate the comparison, the results of Wang and San Miguel (2012), which 
were already shown in Table 1, are combined with the findings for German defense 
contractors, which were shown in Tables 7 and 10. We focus on the findings for ROA 
and ROCE for this comparison. Table 15 shows the combined results. For the 
comparison, we used the numbers of the two-digit industry match from the findings for 
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German defense contractors because this is the best method for the German setting. The 
best size match for German defense contractors is determined by the smallest absolute 
difference. This is the method that was used by Wang and San Miguel (2012) for their 
study. 
The direct comparison of the sample sizes N shows that Wang and San Miguel 
found significantly more matches. The comparison of the standard deviations shows that 
the results for German defense contractors vary stronger than the results for U.S. defense 
contractors. When total assets are used to measure the size of companies, the means of all 
profitability measures show that excessive profits are even more pronounced for German 
defense contractors. Especially the mean of ROCE for German defense contractors is, 
with a value of 11.84%, much higher compared to the same finding for U.S. defense 
contractors (only 3.65%). When revenues is used to determine the company size, the 
number of ROCE for German defense contractors is higher compared to the same number 
of U.S. defense contractors. The difference between ROA is lower for German defense 
contractors when revenues are used to determine the company size.  
The comparison of the p-values reveals the higher power of the study of Wang 
and San Miguel (2012) compared to our findings for German defense contractors. We 
attribute this difference in power of the hypothesis tests to the significant difference in 
sample size. 
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Table 15.   Comparison of excessive profits of German defense contractors 
and U.S. defense contractors. 
 N Mean Min Max Std Dev t P-value 
Panel A: U.S. defense contractors, Size matched by Total Assets 
Excessive  
ROA (%) 
3,809 1.12 -23.49 44.17 7.08 9.773 <0.0001 
Excessive  
ROCE (%) 
3,314 3.65 -143.64 175.57 25.73 8.083 <0.0001 
Panel B: German defense contractors, Size matched by Total Assets 
Excessive  
ROA (%) 
100 1.92 -35.42 43.46 11.74 1.636 0.0525 
Excessive  
ROCE (%) 
99 11.84 -128.42 264.96 46.85 2.514 0.0068 
Panel C: U.S. defense contractors, Size matched by Revenue 
Excessive  
ROA (%) 
3,825 1.04 -21.89 44.37 7.29 8.803 <0.0001 
Excessive  
ROCE (%) 
3,246 3.71 -142.09 178.70 26.08 8.103 <0.0001 
Panel D: German defense contractors, Size matched by Revenue 
Excessive  
ROA (%) 
99 0.48 -27.75 26.18 8.97 0.527 0.2998 
Excessive  
ROCE (%) 
99 21.72 -152.71 1668.09 172.40 1.253 0.1065 
 
In summary, the comparison of the findings for German defense contractors and 
for U.S. defense contractors reveals similar patterns in both countries. Excessive 
profitability is more pronounced for German defense contractors, but the power of the 
hypothesis test for U.S. defense contractors is higher. In Germany and in the United 
States, defense contractors are more profitable than their benchmark companies, which 
were found by the industry-year-size match. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This chapter summarizes the findings of this thesis, discusses limitations, and 
provides areas for further research. We found that, similar to U.S. defense contractors, 
German defense contractors earn economically significant, excessive profits. This work 
provides the first evidence that excessive profitability of defense contractors is not only a 
U.S. phenomenon.  
We found statistical evidence that German defense contractors earn excessive 
profits when ROA and ROCE are used to measure profitability. Our statistical hypothesis 
test supports this finding especially when total assets is used to measure the company size 
and when the first two digits of the SIC are used to define the industry. In contrast, the 
hypothesis test did not support excessive profits when profitability is determined by the 
two revenues based measures PMR and OMR.  
In addition to statistical significance, we document that the magnitudes of 
excessive ROA and ROCE of German defense contractors are economically significant 
as well.  
The comparison between German and U.S. defense contractor’s excessive 
profitability revealed similar patterns in both countries. The statistical evidence for 
excessive profitability is stronger for ROA and ROCE in both countries. The power of 
the test that was conducted by Wang and San Miguel (2012) is higher due to their higher 
sample size.  
We also demonstrated that the perspective on profit differs between the U.S. rules 
and the German contracting system. While profits and fees in the United States are used 
as a tool to share the risk of increasing costs between the government and the contractor, 
profits for German cost-based contracts are determined by the Bonner Equation. Further 
research could reveal that profit-based risk-sharing tools can decrease costs for German 
defense contracts. 
We limited our research exclusively to German defense contractors that were 
publically traded. Whether our results can be transferred to small- and medium-sized 
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companies that are not publically traded, is beyond the scope of this work. Additionally, 
we have no indicators whether our findings hold for German defense contractors that are 
not based in Germany. For the two reasons mentioned above, our findings for German 
defense contractors should only be used to assess publically-traded German defense 
contractors. 
Further research should be conducted on the topic of excessive profits of defense 
contractors worldwide. Countries of Western Europe, Australia, and democratic countries 
in Asia should provide sufficient data for further research. Results from these studies, 
combined with our findings for German defense contractors and with Wang and San 
Miguel’s (2012) findings for U.S. defense contractors, provide a better picture of the 
profitability of defense contractors worldwide. 
For the German setting, further research should not only consider companies that 
are based in Germany, but also countries from the European Union or the EURO-zone. 
This methodology is reasonable because the German economy is tightly connected to 
other economies of the European Union. This would provide a broader data base for 
possible matches and the number of defense contractors can be increased accordingly. 
This broader data base could increase the power of the hypothesis test. Additionally, the 
quality of the size match may increase. 
Another way to overcome the small data base of German defense contractors is to 
do a study on excessive profits that is supported by data from the German government. It 
is in the interest of the German government to find out whether defense contractors earn 
excessive profits on contracts with the German armed forces. 
Wang and San Miguel (2012), and Wang (2013) found determinants for excessive 
profits of defense contractors. This work can be used as a starting point to find 
determinants for excessive profits of German defense contractors. In combination with 
our findings for German defense contractors, a work on determinants of excessive profits 
can be used by the German government to adapt contracting rules and to decide whether 
the payment of excessive profits is necessary for the German government to reimburse 
defense contractors for increased risks that may come from defense contracts, or whether 
 59 
these profits are a waste of resources and need to be reduced or prevented. Finally, the 
source of excessive profits needs to be identified. Especially for the export-oriented 
German economy, excessive profits are not necessarily gained from contracts with the 
German government, but also from other contracts. 
 60 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 61 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Act against restraints of competition [German public law]. (Last amended 2011, 26 July). 
Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Law Gazette], I, 1554. (Bundeskartellamt [German 
Federal Cartel office], Trans.). Retrieved from http://www.gesetze-im-
Internet.de/englisch_gwb/index.html 
Albuquerque, A. (2009). Peer firms in relative performance evaluation. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 48, 69–89. 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany [the German constitution]. (Last 
amended 2010, 21 July). Bundesanzeiger [Federal Law Gazette], I, 944). 
Retrieved from http://www.gesetze-im-Internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html 
Behme, C. (2008, 9 May). Aktueller Begriff—Der Bundessicherheitsrat [Actual term—
the Federal Security Council]. Berlin, Germany: Research services of the 
Deutscher Bundestag. Retrieved from 
http://www.bundestag.de/blob/190224/82b0d64dd83976983f7e785ba156c11b/bu
ndessicherheitsrat-data.pdf 
BwFuhrparkservice GmbH. (n. d.). Daten und Fakten BwFuhrparkService im Überblick 
[Data and facts of BwFuhrparkservice - an overview]. Troisdorf, Germany: 
author. Retrieved from 
http://www.bwfuhrpark.de/de/unternehmen/unternehmensstruktur/daten-und-
fakten/ 
CONET Technologies AG. (2013). NATO agency and Indonesian Army pay visit to 
CONET [press release]. Hennef, Germany: author. Retrieved from 
http://www.conet.de/EN/CONET-Group/Press/News/2013/NATO-Agency-and-
Indonesian-Army-Pay-Visit-to-CONET 
Daimler Communications. (2012, 06 June). Mercedes Benz liefert der Bundeswehr 110 
Zetros Lkw [Mercedes Benz delivers 110 Zetros trucks to the German armed 
forces] [Press release of the author]. Wörth/Koblenz, Germany: author. Retrieved 
from http://media.daimler.com/dcmedia/0-921-1130193-49-1498732-1-0-1-0-0-1-
0-1549054-0-1-0-0-0-0-0.html 
Dechow, P., Hutton, A., & Sloan, R. (1996). Economic Consequences of Accounting for 
Stock-Based Compensation. Journal of Accounting Research, 34, 1‒20. 
 62 
Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public 
supply contracts and public service contracts [public law of the EU]. (Last 
amended 2013, 13 December). Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02004L0018-
20140101&qid=1405630079074&from=EN 
Drägerwerk AG (2011). Technologie im Einsatz. Schutzausrüstung für Militär- und 
Sicherheitskräft [Technology in use: Protection equipment for military and 




Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2014). 
Federal German Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (2014, May). Bericht der 
Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im 
Jahre 2013 (Rüstungsexportbericht 2013) [Report by the government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany on its policy on exports of conventional military 
equipment in 2013]. Berlin, Germany: author. Retrieved from 
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Publikationen/ruestungsexportberich
t-2013,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf 
Federal German Office of Defense Technology and Procurement (1989, 30 June). 
Kalkulatorischer Gewinn in Selbstkostenpreisverträgen; Ablösung der 
Gewinnbemessung nach der Umschlaghäufigkeit des betriebsnotwendigen 
Vermögens durch eine neue Gewinnformel [Calculated profit in cost based 
contracts: Replacement of the measurement by the replacement rate of net assets 
by a new profit equation] [order of the author to subordinated offices]. Koblenz, 
Germany: author. 
Foreign Trade and Payments Act [German public law]. (Last amended 2013, 06 June). 
Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette), I, 1482. (Working translation by the 
Federal German Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy). Retrieved from 
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/A/awg-
englisch,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf 
Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance [German public law]. (Last amended 2013, 02 
August). Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette), I, 2865. (Working translation 




German Ministry of Defense. (2012, 23 November). Verteidigungshaushalt 2013 
[Defense Budget 2013] [Pie chart of the German Defense Budget 2013]. Berlin, 




Gesetz über die Kontrolle von Kriegswaffen [War Weapons Control Act] [German public 
law]. (Last amended 2013, 06 June). Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Law Gazette], I, 
1482. Retrieved from http://www.gesetze-im-
Internet.de/bundesrecht/krwaffkontrg/gesamt.pdf 
Hänßler, B. (2013, 14 June). Die Rüstungsindustrie in Deutschland: Eine Übersicht! [The 
defense industry in Germany: An overview!] [Article in the author’s blog]. 
Retrieved from http://www.robotergesetze.com/2013/06/die-rustungsindustrie-in-
deutschland-eine-ubersicht/ 
IHS Jane’s. (2014, May 6). Germany–Defence Industry. Retrieved from 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?Doc
Type=Reference&ItemId=+++1319754&Pubabbrev=JWDI 
Keller, G. (2009). Statistics for Management and Economics (8th ed.). Mason, OH: 
South-Western Cengage Learning. 
Leitsätze für die Preisermittlung auf Grund von Selbstkosten (Anlage zur Verordnung PR 
Nr. 30/53) [Principles for the determination of cost based prices (annex to the 
regulation PR No 30/53)] [German public law]. (Last amended 2003, 25 
November). Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Law Gazette], I, 2304. Retrieved from 
http://www.gesetze-im-Internet.de/bundesrecht/preisls/gesamt.pdf 
LS telcom AG (2006). Spectrum Management System for the German Military 
integrating into NATO’s ARCADE database. LS telcom Spectrum Winter 2006 
[the company’s customer news magazine], 3. Lichtenau, Germany: author. 
Retrieved from http://www.terjin.net/dl/spectrum_2006_winter.pdf 
McGahan, A. M., & Porter, M. E. (2002). What do we know about variance in 
accounting profitability? Management Science, 48 (7), 834–851. 
MTU Aero Engines AG. (2012, 16 November). Jubiläum: MTU Aero Engines und 
Luftwaffe feiern zehn Jahre Kooperation EJ200 [Anniversary: MTU Aero 
Engines and German Air Force celebrate ten years of cooperation EJ 200] [press 




OHB System AG. (2013, 2 July). OHB System AG awarded contract for the development 
and integration of the SARah radar satellite reconnaissance system for the 
German federal armed forces [press release of the author]. Bremen, Germany: 
author. Retrieved from https://www.ohb-system.de/press-releases-
details/items/ohb-system-ag-awarded-contract-for-the-development-and-
integration-of-the-sarah-radar-satellite-reconnaissance-system-for-the-ge.html 
Regulations on contract awards for public supplies and services-part A (VOL/A) 
[German public law] (2009, 29 December). Bundesanzeiger [Federal Gazette], 
61, 196a, 1–56. [German Federal Ministry of Justice, transl.] Cologne, Germany: 
Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft mbH. Retrieved from the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy website 
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/V/vergabe-vertragsordnung-fuer-
leistungen-vol-en,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf 
Renk AG. (2012, 4 September). Renk develops its naval market domain with large Navy 
orders [press release]. Augsburg, Germany: author. Retrieved from 
http://www.renk.biz/cms_flipbook/P12-04_e/blaetterkatalog/index.html 
Rheinmetall AG (n.d.). A PUMA with more than 1000 horsepower [press release of the 
author]. Düsseldorf, Germany: author. Retrieved from 
http://www.rheinmetall.de/en/rheinmetall_ag/press/themen_im_fokus/ein_puma_
mit_ueber_1000_pferdestaerken/index.php 
Stickney, C. P., Weil, R. L., Schipper, K., & Francis, J. (2010). Financial accounting—
An introduction to concepts, methods, and uses (13th ed.). Mason, OH: South-
Western Cengage Learning. 
Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems (2014, 04 June). Keel laying ceremony for third 125 
class frigate in Hamburg [press release of the author]. Hamburg, Germany: 
author. Retrieved from https://www.thyssenkrupp-marinesystems.com/en/press-
releases/d/uid-bf3f3d14-a7ee-a1ba-3076-ae28f0969f0a.html 
U.S. Department of Defense. (2012, 13 February). DOD releases fiscal 2013 budget 
proposal [press release]. Washington, DC: author. Retrieved from 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15056 
Verordnung PR Nr 30/53 über die Preise bei öffentlichen Aufträgen [regulation No 30/53 
about prices of public contracts] [German public law]. (Last amended 2010, 8 
December). Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Law Gazette], I, 1864. Retrieved from 
http://www.gesetze-im-Internet.de/bundesrecht/preisv_30_53/gesamt.pdf 
Wang, C. (2013). Political connections of the board of directors and defense contractors’ 
excessive profits. In Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Acquisition Research 
Symposium (426–440). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
 65 
Wang, C., & San Miguel, J. (2012). The excessive profits of defense contractors: 
Evidence and determinants. Journal of Public Procurement, 12, 386‒406. 
The World Bank. (2014, 01 July). Gross domestic product 2013 [list of the gross 
domestic products 2013 for 214 countries]. Washington, DC: author. Retrieved 
from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf 
 66 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 67 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
